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OFAC designates a Hamas financing network that ran charity fronts and crypto wallets
Treasury says two France-based charities helped collect more than $2 million for Hamas from 2020 to 2026, with $1.5 million of it collected after the October 7, 2023 attack.
What happened
On October 2, 2026, the US Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated five targets in a Hamas financing network, according to a US Department of the Treasury press release. They are one Hamas military wing figure, two France-based individuals, and two France-based entities.
Treasury named the individuals as Saleem Abdallah Saleem al-Zaq, Faouzi Barika, and Amel Oualid. Al-Zaq is Gaza-based and a battalion deputy in Hamas’s Al-Qassam Brigades. Barika and Oualid are France-based. The entities are Association Baraka, a charity Treasury says Barika and al-Zaq established jointly, and Ensemble C Mieux, a charity established by Oualid.
According to Treasury, Barika and Oualid operated purported humanitarian charities that solicited public donations. Funds moved through cryptocurrency wallets to al-Zaq, who then transferred money to Hamas. Al-Zaq promoted both fundraising accounts on his social media. Treasury says the cryptocurrency transfers totalled hundreds of thousands of dollars.
Treasury says Barika, Oualid, and al-Zaq collected more than $2 million for Hamas from 2020 to 2026. Of that, $1.5 million was collected after the October 7, 2023 attack on Israel. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) led a broad, multi-jurisdictional operation. OFAC coordinated with the FBI and local law enforcement, including the New York Police Department.
Why it matters
Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said: “Terrorist organizations like Hamas rely on sophisticated financial facilitators…Treasury will continue to identify, isolate, and impose consequences.” This suggests that facilitators who raise money from the public through charity fronts sit within OFAC’s reach for terrorist financing (TF), even when part of the flow runs through cryptocurrency wallets.
The mechanics matter more than the headline totals. In this analysis, the pattern combines four elements: a charity presented as humanitarian, a public donation appeal, cryptocurrency wallets, and a Hamas-linked figure promoting the fundraising on social media. Each element is ordinary on its own. The risk sits in the combination.
The timing also deserves attention. Treasury reports that $1.5 million of the more than $2 million came after October 7, 2023. This suggests the pace of collection rose after the attack. Treasury’s figures are period totals, so the shape of that acceleration is not established.
Practitioner angle
Treat this as a screening event first and a typology review second. Treasury’s own compliance warnings include charities being exploited for TF, so a charity customer base deserves a targeted look.
- Screen the names. Run Saleem Abdallah Saleem al-Zaq, Faouzi Barika, Amel Oualid, Association Baraka, and Ensemble C Mieux against customers, beneficial owners, controllers, signatories, and counterparties. Include transliteration variants, and look back over payment history from 2020. Escalate any hit under your sanctions procedures.
- Review non-profit customers. Pull charities and other customers that solicit public donations. Flag donation collection accounts whose funds route onward to cryptocurrency wallets, and test whether the flow matches the stated charitable purpose.
- Add social media as an indicator. This is analysis, not a Treasury red flag. Where a customer’s fundraising account is promoted publicly, check who promotes it and whether they match the customer’s declared officers and controllers.
- Check your counterparties. Identify counterparties that accept cryptocurrency from donor-facing accounts. Confirm you can see who stands behind the receiving wallet.
- Weigh the exposure. Treasury notes that institutions face potential secondary sanctions for knowingly facilitating transactions with designated persons, and that violations carry civil or criminal penalties. Record the date and scope of your screening update.
The single most important step: screen all five names and both charities against your full customer and payment history from 2020, and document the result.
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