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OFAC hits IRGC weapons network built on aviation firms and travel fixers
Seven designations on 15 July reach a Moscow air transport firm, a Nigerian supply company, and a Milan-based individual, and OFAC warns foreign banks about correspondent account exposure.
What happened
On 15 July 2026, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned seven individuals and entities involved in an international network supporting weapons procurement for the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Treasury stated the action followed Iran’s attacks on commercial vessels in the Strait of Hormuz. OFAC acted under Executive Order 13382, which targets weapons of mass destruction proliferators and their supporters.
At the centre sits Iranian national Behrouz Namazi, general director of Nika Jet Company, a Tehran-based provider of services for the production, distribution, and maintenance of aircraft parts and drones. OFAC states Namazi has sought to secure weapons on behalf of the IRGC. Nigeria-based Vanguard Tactical Supply Limited is described as an intermediary for his efforts, and Milan-based Italian national Dounia Ettaib as a witting participant in procuring weapons for him.
The Russian leg runs through Avratek OOO, an aviation transportation company based in Moscow. Russian national Mariya Vladimirovna Selina, a longtime procurement agent for Iran, heads Avratek’s financial department. Fellow Avratek employee Vadim Anatolyevich Druzhbin coordinated travel for Namazi and Selina, and OFAC says he has previously been involved in coordinating Iranian shipments.
Treasury describes the designees as exemplifying Iran’s use of foreign aviation and transport firms, financial conduits, and travel coordinators to obscure the IRGC’s role. Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent said: “Treasury will continue to target and disrupt the illicit procurement networks that fund Iran’s weapons programs and war machine.” The State Department designated the IRGC under E.O. 13382 in October 2007.
Why it matters
Read as analysis, the interesting part of this action is the shape of the network rather than the names on the list. A Moscow air transport company, a Nigerian tactical supply firm, and an individual in Milan are not obviously connected to Tehran on any screening hit. They are counterparties that clear a name screen cleanly and fail a purpose-of-relationship test.
The travel-coordination element deserves attention. Coordinating the movement of people is not a payment pattern most transaction monitoring would flag. Yet OFAC treats it as material support worth a designation, which suggests logistics roles inside proliferation networks are being pursued alongside the money.
OFAC also restated its secondary-sanctions position in concrete terms. It can prohibit or impose strict conditions on maintaining a US correspondent account or payable-through account for a foreign financial institution that knowingly conducts or facilitates any significant transaction on behalf of a designated person. That is a live exposure for any bank clearing dollars through a US counterpart.
Practitioner angle
- Rescreen against the 15 July additions and run the 50 percent rule properly. Entities owned 50 percent or more, individually or in the aggregate, by blocked persons are also blocked, and they will not appear on the list.
- Pull any exposure to aviation parts, air freight, and general trading counterparties in Russia, Nigeria, and Italy. Test whether the stated purpose of the relationship matches the actual payment and shipping activity.
- Treat non-payment services as in scope. Travel bookings, visa support, crew logistics, and charter arrangements sit inside this network’s profile, so check whether your monitoring covers them at all.
- Correspondent banking teams should revisit respondent questionnaires for banks with material Iran-adjacent trade flows and confirm what screening the respondent actually applies.
- Remember that OFAC may impose civil penalties for sanctions violations on a strict liability basis, so a missed match is not defensible on good faith alone.
The single most useful action this week: take one aviation or logistics client in a permissive jurisdiction and test whether your file explains what they actually do.
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